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ABSTRACT
Although they are typically thought to be separate, emotion and reason are
closely linked. Affective feelings are thought to determine which cognitive processing
styles are in place at a given time. Happy moods were previously thought to lead to fast,
automatic, unconscious, global, and superficial processing styles, whereas sad moods
lead to slow, deliberative, conscious, local, and analytic processing styles. More recent
research shows that this link is relatively flexible, so that moods may signal the value of
currently accessible processing styles, or any accessible thoughts. These findings have
important implications for susceptibility to cognitive biases, such as certain types of
anchoring effects. In the proposed project, happy and sad moods will be induced using
either music or stories. Stop rules will be used to manipulate whether mood signals
performance– in this case, adjustment away from self-generated anchoring effects – or
task enjoyment. Happy moods should lead to decreased adjustment compared to sad
moods in the former case, and increased adjustment in the latter.
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION
Emotion and reason have traditionally been viewed as separate, even competing
influences on judgment and decision making. Emotion is thought to contaminate
reason, and it is the job of reason to control the unruly influence of emotion. Recent
perspectives indicate that this might not be the case, and that emotion and reason are
in fact closely connected, with emotion guiding reasoning processes. In particular,
emotion may either help or harm reason by influencing the ways in which individuals
process information. For instance, positive affective feelings, especially happy moods,
are linked to fast, automatic, globally-oriented, and superficial processing styles, often
encouraging a reliance on intuition and heuristics. Negative affective feelings, especially
sad moods, are linked to slow, deliberative, locally-oriented, and systematic processing
styles, often encouraging careful attention to specific details. This interaction between
emotion and cognition may have important implications for susceptibility to judgmental
biases.
Affective Feelings and Cognitive Mistakes
Previous research indicates that emotion may recruit different styles of cognitive
processing. A great deal of research supports the view that positive affective feelings
produce a top-down, global, superficial and heuristic processing style and negative
1
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affective feelings produce a bottom-up, local, systematic and deliberative processing
style. Common explanations of this link between feeling and thinking propose that
positive and negative emotions provide information about one’s current environment.
Sad moods signal a problematic environment, leading to more systematic and
deliberative processing so as to solve or avoid the problem. Happy moods signal a
benign environment in which no increased effort is needed, encouraging superficial and
heuristic processing (Forgas, 2013; Schwarz, 2002). Thus, this research suggests a rather
fixed effect of affective feelings on processing styles, with happy moods directly
producing heuristic processing and sad moods directly producing deliberative
processing.
On judgment and decision-making tasks, the tendency to adopt a more bottomup, detailed style of thinking insulates sad people from many judgmental biases,
whereas the tendency to adopt a more top-down, global style of thinking makes happy
people commit cognitive mistakes. Happy moods, for example, lead individuals to rely
more on scripts and category-based knowledge rather than details compared to sad
moods (Bless et. al, 1996). Happy moods also promote the use of stereotypes, whereas
sad moods promote the use of information that is specific to the individual
(Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Susser, 1994; Isbell, 2004). Happy moods make individuals
more likely to rely on heuristics such as ease-of-retrieval, in which the ease of having to
recall relatively few examples of a trait gives the impression that people possess that
trait (Ruder & Bless, 2003). The tendency of happy moods to encourage more superficial
and categorical thinking styles, though often leading to judgmental biases, is also often
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useful. For example, happy moods allow the formation of broader categories with more
unusual exemplars (Isen & Daubman, 1984), greater levels of abstraction (Beukeboom &
Semin, 2005), and more adept creative problem solving in tasks such as the Remote
Associate’s Test and Duncker’s candle problem (Isen et al., 1987). In a persuasion
context, people in happy moods are often more persuaded by heuristic cues such a
source expertise, whereas sad people are often more persuaded by strong rather than
weak arguments, (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Mackie & Worth, 1989),
indicating heuristic or superficial processing and systematic or deliberative processing,
respectively. Although the tendency to think more systematically and deliberatively may
insulate sad people from many judgmental biases, one exception can be found in
research examining the influence of affective feelings on anchoring effects.
Anchoring Effects
Anchoring effects occur when judgments are influenced by a salient anchor or
starting point even when the value of the anchor is arbitrary or meaningless. For
example, in a classic demonstration of this effect Tversky and Kahneman (1974) asked
their participants two consecutive questions about the percentage of African countries
in the United Nations. The first question asked participants to determine whether the
percentage of countries was higher or lower than an arbitrary number (e.g., 65% or
10%) that was chosen by spinning a wheel. Participants were then asked to estimate of
this percentage. Final estimates were higher when the initial anchor was a higher value
and lower when the anchor was smaller value.
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Initial accounts of anchoring effects proposed that when subjects consider the
anchor, they use this value as a starting point but fail to sufficiently adjust their final
answer away from this starting point, producing estimates that are biased towards the
anchor (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Other accounts suggested that adjustments are
typically insufficient because they stop adjusting near the boundary of a range of
plausible target values closest to the anchor (Quattrone, Lawrence, Finkel, & Andrus,
1981). However, anchoring effects occur even when the anchor is a plausible value for
the target (Northcraft & Neale, 1987), indicating that a failure to adjust past the
boundary of a range of plausible values alone is not responsible for anchoring effects.
Furthermore (Kahneman & Jacowitz, 1995) found that merely comparing a target to an
anchor leads to anchoring effects, and that adjustment is not needed for these effects
to occur. More importantly, little evidence has been found for effortful adjustment
away from the anchor in the standard anchoring paradigm (for a review, see Chapman &
Johnson, 2002). Rather, anchoring appears to result from the fact that individuals tend
to test hypotheses by seeking to confirm them (Klayman & Ha, 1987).
Most current explanations of anchoring effects propose that when people
entertain an initial starting value, they begin by testing the possibility that this value is
correct (Mussweiler, 2003). This biased hypothesis testing calls to mind information
consistent with the anchor (e.g., “Africa is huge,” “There must be a lot of countries in
Africa”), which in turn increases the impact of this initial value on final judgments. The
more extensively individuals entertain the idea that an anchor is correct, the more
information consistent with the anchor that comes to mind, ultimately biasing final
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judgments toward the anchor. Similarly, Chapman and Johnson (1999) suggested that
the process of attending to an anchor activates aspects of the target that are compatible
with the anchor. Once these concepts are activated, individuals may construct aspects
of the target that are compatible with the target, recall them more readily, and weight
them more heavily. This processing of target aspects causes target judgments to
assimilate towards the anchor. Consistent with these predictions, considering target
attributes that were similar to those of the anchor did not influence the magnitude of
anchoring effects, suggesting that such processes may normally underlie anchoring
effects. On the other hand, considering differences between the anchor and the target
attenuated or eliminated anchoring effects. Similarly, priming individuals with a search
for differences as opposed to similarities (Mussweiler, 2002), generating information
that is incompatible with target (e.g., considering an anchor that is on a different
dimension than the target, such as the width of the Brandenburg Gate instead of its
height, Strack & Mussweiler, 1997), and generating support for the idea that the anchor
is not a good potential target value (Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000) weakens
anchoring effects. Furthermore, generating information about an anchor for an unlikely
target produced contrast effects, thereby reversing anchoring effects rather than merely
weakening them (Strack & Mussweiler, 1997).
The studies described above indicate that a spontaneous yet deliberative focus
on anchor-consistent target, rather than a lack of deliberative movement away from the
anchor information, leads to anchoring effects. However, evidence has been found for
adjustment with the case of extreme, highly implausible anchors. While anchoring
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effects occur even if the value is implausible (or impossible), the effect of implausible
anchors seems to diminish with increasing extremity (Chapman & Johnson, 1994).
Mussweiler and Strack (2001b) suggested that one can quickly determine whether or
not a numeric anchor is an appropriate potential value for the target, using easily
accessible category knowledge about the target (Mussweiler & Strack, 2000a). However,
since this knowledge is not sufficient for estimating a target value, individuals might
have to adjust to the nearest boundary of a range of plausible values (Mussweiler &
Strack, 2000b) and conduct a confirmatory test on the hypothesis that the boundary is a
potential value for the target. Consistent with this notion, Mussweiler and Strack
(2001a) found greater anchoring effects between plausibly high and low anchors than
implausibly high anchors differing (by a greater magnitude than the plausible anchors) in
extremity. These findings further support the idea that anchoring effects in absolute
estimates are due to increased focus on anchor-consistent knowledge.
The more elaborate, deliberative, and extensive processing of information
triggered by negative affect should increase the generation of anchor-consistent
information. As a result, sad individuals are more susceptible to anchoring effects
(Bodenhausen, Gabriel & Lineberger, 2000). Similarly, Englich and Soder (2009) found
that sad moods lead to anchoring effects whereas happy moods greatly reduced
anchoring effects in non-experts. Experts, who are less susceptible to the influence of
mood, showed strong anchoring effects regardless of whether they were happy or sad.
These findings indicate that happy moods may lead to less thorough processing of the
anchor compared to sad moods, and thus, weaker anchoring effects.
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A Flexible Influence of Affective Feelings on Processing Style
Most affect-cognition theories suggest that particular affective feelings recruit
particular styles of processing, with positive feelings triggering heuristic, global, and
superficial processing and negative feelings triggering, systematic, local, and deliberative
processing. These accounts predict a rather simple relationship between affective
feelings and anchoring effects.
Other accounts suggest instead that the link between affect and processing
styles might not be fixed. According to the Affect as Cognitive Feedback Account
(Huntsinger, Isbell & Clore, 2014), the information conveyed by affective feelings is far
more general and less constrained that previously assumed. Thus, rather than only
providing information about the environment, this view suggests instead that affective
feelings provide embodied feedback about the adequacy of currently accessible mental
content, including accessible thoughts and styles of thinking. Happy moods signal that
accessible thoughts and styles of thinking are adequate for the task, thereby facilitating
their use. Sad moods signal that such thoughts and styles of thinking are inadequate,
thereby inhibiting their use. If this is the case, happy moods will encourage the
continued use of whichever style of processing is accessible at a given moment, whereas
sad moods will encourage use of the other style.
Such a view suggests that the aforementioned influence of affect on anchoring
effects will reverse if an analytic, deliberative, and local style of processing made
accessible, rather than the usually default heuristic, superficial, and global style of
processing. Just such a result was recently obtained. In this research (Huntsinger & Ray,
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2014), participants were primed via a word completion task with either deliberative,
analytic processing styles or superficial processing styles, and afterwards they read
either a happy or sad story. They then completed the anchoring questions taken from
Jacowitz and Kahneman (1995). As predicted, there was a significant interaction of
mood and processing style, such that happy participants showed greater anchoring
effects than sad participants when primed with deliberative, analytic processing styles;
whereas sad participants showed greater anchoring effects than happy participants
when primed superficial, heuristic processing styles. The results of these studies indicate
that the impact of mood on anchoring effects might be more flexible depending on
accessible processing styles than earlier accounts might propose.
The discussion of anchoring effects thus far concerned situations in which
anchors are provided by some source outside of participants, in most cases the
experimenter. In cases of experimenter provided anchors, research indicates that
deliberative, systematic processing makes anchoring effects more pronounced whereas
superficial, heuristic processing makes them less pronounced (Bodenhausen et al., 2000;
Englich & Soder, 2009). This relationship between affect and anchoring effects was
recently found to be flexibly responsive to the relative accessibility of heuristic versus
deliberative styles of processing, as predicted by the Affect as Cognitive Feedback
Account (Huntsinger et al., 2014). There are circumstances in which anchors are
generated by the self, however. In such cases the role of processing style in enhancing
or attenuating anchoring effects is the opposite of that for experimenter provided
anchors.
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Self-Generated Anchors
Self-generated anchors are those which the subject knows are close to the target
value, and which typically come to mind quickly. Epley and Gilovich (2001)
demonstrated that when anchors are self-generated, they operate as mental shortcuts,
or heuristics. This stands in contrast to experimental anchors, which operate as the
objects of a confirmatory hypothesis test. After the anchor comes to mind, subjects then
may engage in deliberative adjustment away from the anchor. In such cases, factors that
increase the use of detailed, systematic and deliberative processing styles should reduce
anchoring effects and factors that decrease the use such processing styles should
enhance anchoring effects. For instance, when asked in what year George Washington
was elected president, most individuals know that it is not long after 1776, when
America declared its independence from Britain. Most participants do not estimate that
George Washington was elected as late as 1789. In this experiment, those who nodded
their heads were apparently more accepting of the self-generated anchors and provided
estimates that were closer to the anchor than those who shook their heads. In the latter
case, head-shaking lead to denial of the self-generated anchor and lead to more
deliberative and extensive adjustment away from the anchor. Thus, a lack of cognitive
effort thus led to insufficient adjustment.
In other research, Epley and Gilovich (2006) manipulated various factors that
reduce the capacity for deliberative, systematic, and local processing to determine if
they could influence adjustment. They found that participants who had low motivation
to engage in detailed thinking, who were placed under cognitive load, or who had
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recently consumed alcohol adjusted less from self-generated anchors than those who
had high motivation, had not consumed alcohol, or were not placed under cognitive
load. Furthermore, Epley and Gilovich (2005) showed that forewarnings and incentives
lead to increased adjustment away from self-generated anchors, but not from
experimenter-provided anchors. This indicates that careful, deliberative thinking leads
to increased adjustment away from self-generated anchors. These findings indicate that
processing styles may have different impacts on anchoring effects depending on the
type of anchor.
The Proposed Research
Past research revealed flexibility in the influence of affective feelings on
experimenter provided anchors as a consequence of the accessibility of tendencies to
engage in different styles of processing. The purpose of the experiment proposed here
was twofold. First, no research to date has examined the influence of affective feelings
on self-generated anchoring. Thus one purpose was to demonstrate that such an
influence exists. Because self-generated anchors serve as heuristics, the traditional
influence of affective feelings on judgmental biases should be observed, such that
positive affect should enhance and negative affect should decrease anchoring effects.
This result would be consistent with prior research demonstrating an influence of
implicit affective cues, such as head nodding versus head shaking (Epley & Gilovich,
2001) and arm flexion versus arm extension (Epley & Gilovich, 2004), on self-generated
anchoring.
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A second purpose was to examine flexibility in the influence of affective feelings
on self-generated anchors. If affective feelings directly recruit different styles of
processing, and if systematic processing increases adjustment from self-generated
anchors, then one would only predict a main effect of affective feelings on anchoring
effects. Specifically, happy moods will lead to greater acceptance of the anchor and
produce estimates that are closer to the anchor than sad moods, which will lead to
rejection of the anchor and produce estimates that are further away. On the other
hand, if the influence of mood on processing styles depends on people’s interpretation
of their moods (Martin et al., 1993), or if mood confers value on currently accessible
processing orientations (Huntsinger, Isbell, & Clore, 2014), then the influence of mood
on self-generated anchoring effects should be flexibly responsive to changing cognitive
contexts.
This possibility was examined by adopting the stop rule paradigm developed by
Martin and colleagues (Martin et al., 1993). In one study, for example, individuals in
happy and sad moods were given a stack of cards containing information about a target
and were instructed to form an impression of him. Half of the participants were told to
read the information until they felt that they had enough for forming their impression,
whereas the other half were told to continue reading until they no longer enjoyed it.
Consistent with the idea that happiness serves as a “go” signal and sadness as a “stop”
signal, happy participants in the “enough information” condition stopped reading
behaviors sooner than did sad participants. Importantly, these effects reversed in the
“enjoy” condition. That is, individuals in happy moods relied on their affective cues to

12
indicate that they were still enjoying the task, and thus the implication was that they
should continue it. In contrast, those in sad moods interpreted their affect as an
indication that they no longer enjoyed the task, and consequently they stopped sooner.
These results were among the first to reveal that the information conveyed by mood
varies with what is accessible in different contexts (in this case different goal contexts).
Based on this research, I predicted that the impact of mood on adjustment from
self-generated anchors should depend on whether or not mood is interpreted to
indicate enjoyment of a task or progress towards a goal. I hypothesized that when
following an enjoyment stop rule, happy participants will adjust farther from selfgenerated anchors than sad participants. However, when following a performance stop
rule, sad participants will adjust farther from self-generated anchors than happy
participants. This latter pattern should also hold true when participants are not
instructed to follow any particular stop rule, since Martin et al. (1993) reasoned that
people may typically adopt a performance-based stop rule when completing a task by
default. Furthermore, Martin et al (1993, Experiment 2) found an effect of Need for
Cognition, an individual difference variable reflecting how much an individual enjoys
engaging in effortful thought (Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao). Specifically, they found that
the stop rule by mood interaction only held true for those high in Need for Cognition.
Thus, Need for Cognition was examined for exploratory purposes, since it might
influence the effect of mood on amount of processing.

CHAPTER TWO
METHODS
Participants
Participants consisted of 177 undergraduate students at Loyola University
Chicago who completed the experiment in exchange for course credit. The study design
is a 2 (mood: happy, sad) x 3 (stop rule: enjoyment, performance, none) betweenparticipants factorial. There were approximately 30 participants per cell.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were told that the purpose of the study was to examine thinking and
reasoning processes. Participants were told that while participating in the main
experiment, they would listen to music as part of a pilot test for a future study. They
then completed the mood manipulation by describing a life event (see Appendix A) and
listening to music that has been shown to successfully induce happy and sad moods in
prior research. In the positive mood condition, participants wrote about a happy event
while listening to Mozart’s “Eine kleine Nachtmusick” via headphones. In the negative
mood condition, participants wrote about a sad event while listening to Mahler’s
“Adagietto.” Subjects will then move on to the anchoring task. Participants were
instructed to provide a series of numeric estimates following one of three stop rules
adapted from Martin and colleagues (1993) and Hirt and colleagues (1997) to fit the
13
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task. In the performance stop rule condition, participants were told to provide an
answer and move on to the next question when they felt that they had reached a
sufficient estimate. In the enjoyment condition, participants were told to provide an
answer when they no longer enjoyed thinking about the question. Those in the no stop
rule condition were instructed to provide an estimate and move on to the next question
(Appendix B). Participants then completed eight anchoring questions (e.g., “When was
Washington elected president?”) from Epley and Gilovich (2001; 2006, see Appendix C).
They completed a mood manipulation check (Appendix D) and were asked to indicate
whether they knew the anchor for each item, and if it came to mind during the
anchoring task (Appendix E). They also completed a series of questions adapted from
Hurt et al. 1997 to assess subjective performance on the task: “How much effort did you
put into the task?” (1=very little to 7=very much), “How well do you think you
performed at this task?” (1=very poorly to 7=very well), “How satisfied are you with
your level of performance on this task?” (1=very unsatisfied to 7=very satisfied), and
“Overall, how accurate do you think your set of responses to this task were?” (1=not at
all accurate to 7=very accurate). Finally, they completed the short-form Need for
Cognition Scale (Cacioppo, Petty, & Kao, 1984, Appendix F).
Analyses
The happy and sad (reverse-scored) mood manipulation items formed a subscale
with sufficient reliability, α = .89. Thus, these items were averaged together to create a
single measure of happy (versus sad) mood. The results of the mood manipulation were
analyzed using a 2(mood: positive vs. negative) by 3(stop rule: performance, enjoyment,
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none) analysis of variance (ANOVA). It was expected that participants would report
more positive feelings after writing about a happy life event and listening to happy
music than after writing about a sad life event and listening to sad music. It was also
expected that there would be no effect of stop rule. Furthermore, the items pertaining
to arousal (e.g. tired, reverse-scored) also formed a reliable scale, α = .83, so these items
were also combined to form a single measure of arousal. These items were also
submitted to the Mood X Stop Rule ANOVA to ensure that there were no unwanted
influences on arousal.
Consistent with prior research (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006), anchoring effects
were measured by calculating a standardized anchor-estimate gap. The absolute
difference between the estimates provided and the self-generated anchor was
standardized across participants for each item (such that positive numbers indicated
further adjustment from the anchors) and then averaged for each participant across
items. Also consistent with prior research (Epley & Gilovich, 2006), participants were
excluded on an item-by-item basis if they did not know the anchor for each question,
indicate that the anchor came to mind, or provide an answer for the question.
Participants were also excluded if they failed to provide a single definite answer (e.g.
“1800s” or “more than 20”). The results were analyzed using a 2 (mood: happy, sad) by
3 (stop rule: enjoyment, performance, none) analysis of variance (ANOVA).

CHAPTER THREE
RESULTS
Manipulation Check Results
Submitting the mood manipulation check to the Mood by Stop Rule ANOVA
revealed the predicted main effect of mood, F(1, 177) = 466.38, p <.001. Specifically,
participants reported feeling happier in the positive mood condition (M= 5.37, SD =
0.87) than they did in the negative mood condition (M= 2.19, SD = 1.87). There was no
significant main effect of stop rule, F(2,177)= 0.113, p = .893, or interaction effect
between mood and stop rule, F(2,177)= .243, p = .784. An ANOVA revealed that there
was also a significant effect of the mood manipulation on arousal, F (1,177) = 146.965, p
< .001, such that participants reported that they felt more aroused in the positive mood
condition than in the negative mood condition. They felt more aroused in the positive
mood condition (M = 4.93, SD = 0.88) than they did in the negative mood condition (M =
3.28, SD = 0.94). There was no significant main effect of stop rule, F(2,177)= 1.16, p =
.316, or interaction effects between mood and stop rule, F(2,177)= 1.097, p = .336.
Anchoring Results
The ANOVA revealed an insignificant interaction effect between mood and stop
rule on adjustment from the anchor, F(2, 171) = 0.80, p = .453. There were also no
significant main effects of mood, F(1, 171) = .452, p = .503, or stop rule, F(2, 171) =
16
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1.531, p = .219. However, the analysis largely revealed the predicted pattern of means.
Specifically, when following a performance stop rule, sad participants (M = 0.12, SD =
0.69) adjusted farther away from the self-generated anchor than happy participants (M
= 0.04, SD = 0.61). However, when following an enjoyment stop rule, happy participants
(M = -0.08, SD = 0.28) adjusted further away from the self-generated anchor than sad
participants (M = -0.14, SD = 0.56). In contrast to the predictions, however, happy
participants (M = 0.08, SD = 0.61) adjusted further from the anchors than sad
participants (M = -0.11, SD=0.59, see Figure 1) when they were not instructed to follow
a particular stop rule.
Figure 1. Anchoring Results.
Values represent standardized anchor-estimate gaps as a function of mood and stop
rule condition. Higher values represent greater adjustment away from the anchors.
0.2
0.1
0
-0.1

Performance

Enjoyment

None

-0.2
Happy

Sad

Exploratory Analyses
Regression analyses were conducted to examine if Need for Cognition
moderated the interaction effect between mood and stop rule on adjustment from the
anchors. Dummy variables were created for mood and stop rule. No significant two-way
or three-way interaction effects were found, all t’s < -1.58, p’s > .116. Furthermore, I
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also examined if mood and stop rule condition had any effects on responses to the
measures of subjective task performance. Eight participants who had previously been
excluded from analysis of adjustment from anchors were included in this analysis
because they were not missing data on these measures. There were no significant
effects on reported effort, F’s < 1.79, p’s > .171; how well participants believed they
performed, F’s < 1.80, p’s > .168; satisfaction with performance, F’s < 0.99, p’s > .373, or
perceived accuracy, F’s < 1.22, p’s > .298.
Latency data were also submitted to a Mood X Stop Rule ANOVA. There was a
significant effect of stop rule, F(2,179) = 6.066, p < .003. There was no significant main
effect of mood, F(1,179) = 1.11, p = .293, or interaction effect between mood and stoprule, F(2,179) = .396, p = .674. Post-hoc comparisons using the Bonferroni test revealed
that participants spent the longest amount of time (in seconds) on anchoring items in
the performance stop rule condition (M = 18.30, SD = 7.64) than in the no stop rule
condition (M = 14.10, SD = 5.30), p < .003. There was also a marginally significant mean
difference between the enjoyment stop rule condition and no stop rule condition, such
that participants spent longer in the enjoyment stop rule condition (M = 16.98 SD =
7.41) than in the no stop rule condition (M = 14.10, SD = 5.30), p = .062.

CHAPTER FOUR
DISCUSSION
In conclusion, I attempted to examine if the influence of mood on motivation
and effort depended on how individuals interpreted their mood (i.e., consistent with
Martin et al.’s account; 1993) or what thoughts were currently accessible (consistent
with the Affect as Cognitive Feedback Account; Huntsinger, Isbell & Clore, 2014). It was
proposed that positive moods would confer positive value on accessible thoughts,
whereas negative moods would confer negative value. In particular, if participants were
judging whether their current performance or goal progress was sufficient, positive
moods would signal that the performance was sufficient, causing participants to stop
working on the task. Negative moods would signal that performance was insufficient,
leading to sustained effortful processing. Conversely, if participants were judging
whether the current task was enjoyable, positive moods would signal that it was
enjoyable, leading to continued work on the task. Negative moods would signal that the
task was not enjoyable, causing participants to stop working on the task.
Our study did not find the hypothesized interaction effect of mood and stop rule
condition. Participants adjusted to a similar degree regardless of mood, and regardless
of whether they were instructed to stop when they no longer enjoyed the task, when
they felt they had performed sufficiently, or had been given no particular stop rule
19
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instructions at all. These results are largely inconsistent with past findings regarding the
influence of mood on motivation and effort, in which the amount of effort spent on a
task depended on the information conveyed by one’s mood. While the pattern of means
was consistent with such findings, it provides only weak support for the idea that the
interpretation of one’s mood may regulate motivation and effort in adjustment from
self-generated anchors.
One potential reason that the hypothesized results may not have emerged is
that participants were rather unwilling to provide estimates of the target values we
asked them about. Even though the instructions emphasized that participants should
put down an answer, even if it was only a guess, many participants did not answer a
number of the questions. This appeared to be the case even if participants knew the
correct anchor for the question, and if the anchor came to mind. For example, even if
participants thought of the year 1776 when considering when Washington was elected,
they preferred to not offer any answer at all rather than merely providing “1776” as
their final estimate. Another potential reason that the predicted findings did not emerge
is that many participants could not, in fact, report the correct anchor. Future research
might collect demographic information on country of origin, since some of the items
used pertained specifically to U.S. history.
Yet another potential reason that the hypothesized results failed to emerge is
that it might be somewhat difficult to focus on or monitor the amount of time or effort
spent in thinking about a task such as the self-generated anchoring task. The tasks
employed by Martin and colleagues (1993) and Hirt and colleagues (1997) involved
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flipping over cards with information and generating category examples. It is relatively
easy to examine how many responses one has written down or how many cards one has
turned over, even if judgments about how many of these responses constitutes “a lot”
or “enough.” Conversely, it might be more difficult to monitor or examine how much
thought or effort one has put into mentally adjusting an estimate away from an anchor.
That is, this information might be less available in working memory than items such as
cards or written responses in front of the participant that can be easily counted up. If
such thoughts about effort are not highly available, they might subsequently be less
accessible. Thus, it might be more difficult for mood to confer value on these thoughts
and subsequently regulate motivation and performance.
On the other hand, the effect of stop rule on latency data may suggest that the
instructions played a larger part in determining how much effort is sufficient to a task
than mood did. Perhaps the performance stop rule, in particular, conveyed rather
unambiguously that participants should try harder at this task than they might normally
be inclined to. In such cases, participants may not rely on their moods when judging
whether or not the amount of time and effort they have spent is sufficient. This is
consistent with Forgas’ (1995) discussion of the Affect-As-Information account (Schwarz
& Clore, 1988), in which he suggests that mood may not inform judgment if one is
already able to easily bring a judgment to mind. This could be the case even if the mood
manipulation was highly successful, as it appeared to be in this study. A similar
interpretation as to why mood did not influence perceived enjoyment is that
participants unambiguously disliked the task. However, this could be inconsistent with
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the finding that participants spent more time on the task than those in performance
stop rule condition – even if they did not provide many answers. Future research might
more closely examine if more time spent on a task reflects more motivation, as opposed
to, for example, confusion and hesitation.

APPENDIX A
MOOD INDUCTION
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Instructions:
We are attempting to pilot test musical selections for a future study. Please put your
headphones on, and press Ctrl+alt+insert to begin playing the music. You will listen to
the music throughout the subsequent tasks.
Positive mood:
We are trying to create a Life Events Inventory. To accomplish this, we would like you to
describe as vividly and in as much detail as possible a recent event that made you feel
REALLY HAPPY.
Your response will be used to generate the items for the life event inventory. When
recalling the recent event, please pay attention to the emotional aspects of the event,
how the event made you feel, what aspects of the event made you feel that way, and so
forth.
This should take about 8-10 minutes to complete. Note: on the next page, press enter
only when finished writing.
Negative mood:
We are trying to create a Life Events Inventory. To accomplish this, we would like you to
describe as vividly and in as much detail as possible a recent event that made you feel
REALLY SAD.
Your response will be used to generate the items for the life event inventory. When
recalling the recent event, please pay attention to the emotional aspects of the event,

25
how the event made you feel, what aspects of the event made you feel that way, and so
forth.
This should take about 8-10 minutes to complete. Note: on the next page, press enter
only when finished writing.

APPENDIX B
ANCHORING INSTRUCTIONS AND STOP RULE MANIPULATIONS
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Performance stop rule (adapted from Martin et. al, 1993):
On the following page, you will be asked to provide a series of numerical
estimates. As you go through each question, each time you think of a possible answer,
ask yourself: ‘Have I reached a sufficient estimate?’ If the answer is ‘no,’ continue to
think about the question. If the answer is ‘yes,’ then stop, indicate the estimate in the
space provided, and move on to the next question. There is no right or wrong time to
stop. Stop thinking about the question when you feel you have reached a sufficient
estimate, and move on to the next question.
Enjoyment stop rule:
On the following page, you will be asked to provide a series of numerical estimates. As
you go through each question, you may ask yourself how you should decide when to
stop and go on to the next question. We would like you to provide an answer when you
know longer enjoy thinking about the question. In other words, as you are thinking
about each question, keep asking yourself “Do I feel like I continuing to think about this
question?” As long as the answer is “yes,” then continue. When the answer becomes
‘no,’ then stop, indicate the estimate in the space provided, and move on to the next
question. There is no right or wrong time to stop. Think about each question until you
no longer enjoy it. We are interested in people's enjoyment of different tasks.
No stop rule:
On the following page, you will be asked to provide a series of numerical estimates.

APPENDIX C
ANCHORING QUESTIONS
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The year that the second European explorer, after Columbus, landed in the West Indies
(1492)
The boiling point (in _F) of water on Mt. Everest (212)
The number of U.S. states in 1840 (50)
The number of days it takes Mars to orbit the Sun (365)
The year that the last of Jesus’ apostles died (0)
The freezing point (in _F) of vodka (32)
The year that George Washington was first elected President (1776)
What is the gestation period of an African elephant? (months; 9)
Taken from Epley and Gilovich, (2006).

APPENDIX D
MOOD MANIPULATION CHECK
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For the following series of questions, indicate the degree to which the writing task (i.e.,
the Life Events Inventory) evoked certain feelings (1 = not at all, 7 = very much).
How angry did you feel during the writing task (i.e., the Life Events Inventory)?
How sad did you feel during the writing task (i.e., the Life Events Inventory)?
How happy did you feel during the writing task (i.e., the Life Events Inventory)?
How alert did you feel during the writing task (i.e., the Life Events Inventory)?
How tired did you feel during the writing task (i.e., the Life Events Inventory)?
How happy did you feel during the writing task (i.e., the Life Events Inventory)?
How angry did the writing task make you feel?
How happy did the writing task make you feel?
How sad did the writing task make you feel?
How alert did the writing task make you feel?
How tired did the writing task make you feel?
In the events that you described, to what extent did you typically feel that someone
other than yourself had the ability to influence what was happening?
In the events that you described, to what extent did you typically feel that someone else
was to blame for what was happening in the situation?
In the events that you described, to what extent were the events beyond anyone’s
control?
How uncertain were you about what would happen next?
How well did you understand what was happening in the situation?
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To what extent did you feel certain that your perspective on the situation was correct?
How well could you predict what was going to happen next?
How angry did you feel while listening to the music?
How sad did you feel while listening to the music?
How happy did you feel while listening to the music?
How alert did you feel while listening to the music?
How tired did you feel while listening to the music?
How happy did you feel while listening to the music?
How angry did the music make you feel?
How happy did the music make you feel?
How sad did the music make you feel?
How alert did the music make you feel?
How tired did the music make you feel?

APPENDIX E
ANCHOR CHECK
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Please answer the following questions.
What is the year that Columbus landed in the West Indies?
What is the boiling point (in _F) of water?
What is the number of U.S. states?
How many days it takes Earth to orbit the Sun?
What year was Jesus born?
What is the freezing point (in _F) of water?
What year did America declare independence from Britain?
What is the gestation period of a human (the duration of pregnancy, in months)?
Please indicate whether the following numbers came to mind during the general
knowledge task.
Did the year that Columbus landed in the West Indies (1492) come to mind during the
first part of the experiment?
Did the boiling point of water (212 _F) come to mind during the first part of the
experiment?
Did the number of U.S. States (50) come to mind during the first part of the experiment?
Did the number of days it takes Earth to orbit the Sun (365) come to mind during the
first part of the experiment?
Did the year that Jesus was born (0) come to mind during the first part of the
experiment?
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Did the freezing point of water (32 _F) come to mind during the first part of the
experiment?
Did the year that America declared independence from Britain (1776) come to mind
during the first part of the experiment?
Did the gestation period of a human (9 months) come to mind during the first part of
the experiment?

APPENDIX F
18-ITEM NEED FOR COGNITION SCALE
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1. I would prefer complex to simple problems.
2. I like to have the responsibility of handling a situation that requires a lot of thinking.
3. Thinking is not my idea of fun.*
4. I would rather do something that requires little thought than something that is sure
to challenge my thinking abilities.*
5. I try to anticipate and avoid situations where there is a likely chance I will have to
think in depth about something.*
6. I find satisfaction in deliberating hard and for long hours.
7. I only think as hard as I have to.*
8. I prefer to think about small, daily projects to long-term ones.*
9. I like tasks that require little thought once I’ve learned them.*
10. The idea of relying on thought to make my way to the top appeals to me.
11. I really enjoy a task that involves coming up with new solutions to problems.
12. Learning new ways to think doesn’t excite me very much.*
13. I prefer my life to be filled with puzzles that I must solve.
14. The notion of thinking abstractly is appealing to me.
15. I would prefer a task that is intellectual, difficult, and important to one that is
somewhat important but does not require much thought.
16. I feel relief rather than satisfaction after completing a task that required a lot of
mental effort.*
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17. It’s enough for me that something gets the job done; I don’t care how or why it
works.*
18. I usually end up deliberating about issues even when they do not affect me
personally.
*Reverse scoring is used on this item.
Taken from Cacioppo, Petty, and Kao (1984).
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